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UNILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT:  
A SCENARIO-BASED APPROACH TO GUIDING AMERICA'S FUTURE  
FOREIGN POLICY

by

James E. Bass, Major, USAF

Advisor: Mr. John T. Ackerman, PhD

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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### ***Abstract***

The United States in recent years has demonstrated a preference for unilateral engagement that has undermined its long-term interests. Specifically, since the 9/11 terror attacks, the US has employed its unchallenged power and the freedom of action afforded by a unilateral engagement policy to attain national interests rather than constrain its actions to the rules and impediments of multilateral cooperation. This strategy has evoked hostility toward the US and eroded the US's international legitimacy. The situation suggests that unilateral engagement is inadequate in the new foreign policy context and that an alternative policy must be employed by future US leaders to secure America's future. As President Obama's administration takes office America carries the cost of preceding unilateral foreign policy. The time is right to reexamine America's foreign policy strategy to chart a course of action that will best assure the future interests of the US and its allies. This research argues that a multilateral engagement foreign policy will ensure national security is protected and America's global leadership maintained regardless of future changes in the international system. Analysis of alternative futures by means of the scenario-planning process suggests multilateral engagement provides an attractive course for securing national security and maintaining America's global leadership.

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

### **Issue Background and Significance**

The United States has demonstrated a trend toward unilateral action during the last two decades that has weakened its international status and undermined the US's long-term interests.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, US foreign policy since the 9/11 terror attacks has viewed international institutions as a nuisance rather than an effective means to advance national interests, and instead of strengthening international alliances to advance its interests, the US has acted unilaterally.<sup>2</sup> In post-9/11 international engagement, the US has pursued the benefits of a unilateral foreign policy strategy rather than constrain its actions to the rules and impediments of multilateral cooperation. The US has endeavored to use its unchallenged power and freedom of action and sovereignty afforded by a unilateral engagement policy to attain national interests. Consequently, America shoulders nearly sole responsibility for the war in Iraq and has propagated much international distrust. Indeed, this strategy has evoked hostility toward the US and eroded the US's international legitimacy. The 2008 Global Attitudes Project conducted by the Pew Research Center reports a decline in America's international image and widespread opposition to US foreign policy since 2001.<sup>3</sup> As President Obama's administration takes office America carries the cost of preceding unilateral foreign policy. The time is right to reexamine America's foreign policy strategy to chart a course of action that will best assure the future interests of the US and its allies.

This research presents future scenarios intended to raise issues that may confront tomorrow's policymakers. The benefits of the scenario-planning research method in the realm of foreign policy studies is its ability to depict alternative futures within which future leaders will attempt to make sound policy choices. In the domain of foreign policy, historic case studies

alone do not capture the dynamic nature of the evolving international order. If policymakers are to ensure the best possible policy strategy in an unpredictable global context, research must examine alternative futures that may confront leaders with myriad opportunities and challenges. This research could help to guide upcoming national security strategy to the best possible course for future foreign policy engagement regardless of changes in the international system.

### **Argument and Thesis Statement**

This research argues that a multilateral engagement foreign policy could ensure national security is protected and America's global leadership maintained regardless of future changes in the international system. Analysis of alternative futures by means of the scenario-planning process suggests multilateral engagement provides an attractive course for securing national security and maintaining America's global leadership. Indeed, the policy decisions of America's future leaders will have a major impact on national security and the status of American hegemony. This fact alone demands policymakers develop a national strategy that will lead America down the path to a secure future. Employing the scenario-planning approach to identify potential US multilateral engagement solutions across an array of alternative futures uncovers the positive benefits of multilateral engagement. Critics may argue, however, that the anarchic international environment calls for America to act alone to provide its own security and ensure its own interests no matter what future should emerge. Unfortunately, US unilateral action has eroded America's legitimacy and evoked international hostility.<sup>4</sup> The current situation suggests that unilateral engagement is inadequate in the new foreign policy context and that an alternative policy should be employed by future US leaders to secure America's future.

## **Chapter 2: Background**

Foreign policy engagement is an important enterprise with major impact on national security and the status of American hegemony. This background chapter briefly reviews the recent history of US foreign policy strategy and engagement and examines the new global foreign policy context to provide a foundation for this study. It then breaks down the benefits and costs of unilateral and multilateral policy engagement to help guide strategy choices for the alternative futures depicted later in the future scenarios chapter.

### **A Short History of US Foreign Policy Engagement/Strategy**

According to Stewart Patrick of the Center on International Cooperation, America's preference for unilateral engagement is explained by three inherent characteristics. First, a sense of "exceptionalism" that evolved from America's founding principles has had major influence on US policy goals and engagement.<sup>5</sup> As a champion for liberal principles the US is motivated to cooperate with others to promote universal prosperity and security. Nevertheless, American exceptionalism also motivates the US to protect its values, and avoid any engagement that might infringe upon its sovereignty.<sup>6</sup> In fact, America's preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty yielded a predilection for unilateralism throughout the 1900's.<sup>7</sup> Not until it attained great power status, did the US consent to multilateralism. Specifically, after World War II, the US employed multilateralism to rebuild a favorable international framework that would counter the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Cold War dominated foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War period foreign policy was dictated by the executive branch and focused primarily on the threat of nuclear war. The President committed to multilateral agreements where it served national security.<sup>8</sup>



Second, the system of checks and balances built into the US Constitution produced a separation of powers that limits the government's ability to endorse multilateral commitments. Specifically, two-thirds of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification to occur. This construct makes it possible for political minorities to hinder multilateral engagement.<sup>9</sup> For example, during World War I the Republican-controlled Senate rejected US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilson's support.<sup>10</sup> Third, America's current hegemonic status provides incentive to act unilaterally because multilateral engagement is based on rules and norms rather than power. As a consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of multilateral cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint.<sup>11</sup> For example, a given UN convention limiting freedom of action with regard to national instruments of power could severely hamper achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital interests at risk. On the same note, such a convention could embolden a weaker adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that the US will limit its response within the restraints of the convention.

Here it is helpful to note specific instances in which the three inherent characteristics aforementioned have guided US action on foreign policy issues. To begin with, the US has used military force without United Nations (UN) approval. While the US did attain UN approval for coalition intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, America's frustrations with the impediments of multilateralism lead it to act without UN approval in the 1998 bombing of Iraq and the 1999 ousting of Serbian forces from Kosovo. These interventions set a precedent for the future unilateral use of force.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the US demonstrated its most dramatic disregard for international institutions in March of 2003 when President Bush unilaterally issued Saddam Hussein an ultimatum despite a lack of UN support. While the US made an effort to gain UN

authorization for the war in Iraq, there is little doubt that the administration had already determined its intended course of action prior to submitting the UN proposal for use of force in February of 2003. America's praiseworthy efforts to gain UN support was a multilateral endeavor that initially suppressed anti-American sentiments.<sup>13</sup> However, the "Bush Doctrine" and America's failed efforts to restore stability in post-war Iraq proved US policy to be shortsighted resulting in international opposition to US policy and calling into question traditional east-west alliances.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, the US has increasingly restricted support for UN peacekeeping operations since its failures in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>15</sup> In addition to declining peacekeeping assistance, the US is also to blame, in part, for the shortcomings in UN effectiveness due to its neglectful financial provisions. In fact, the UN case is only one of several instances in which the US demonstrated a disregard for international institutions through its waning financial support during the 1990s.<sup>16</sup>

The US has also shown disregard for multilateral cooperation on global security issues. Regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, the US Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 only after insisting on exemptions that diluted its impact, and in 1999 the Senate weakened nonproliferation efforts and snubbed allies when it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.<sup>17</sup> Also in 1999, the US upset international order by espousing support for a national missile defense (NMD) system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Risking global strategic stability, in 2001 the Bush administration pushed Moscow for modification of the ABM Treaty, and subsequently withdrew unilaterally in 2002 after failing to secure Russia's cooperation.<sup>18</sup> Yet another example of US indifference to multilateral cooperation with regard to WMD threats involves the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ineffective due to the absence of a compliance scheme, international efforts

to implement verification procedures were rejected by the Bush administration in 2001 on the grounds that they did not coincide with US national interests.<sup>19</sup>

US lack of interest in multilateral cooperation on global security issues extends beyond WMD threats. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration refused to sign the Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. Despite the fact that the convention has been signed by 156 countries, the US still declines accession arguing that land mines are a critical component of its Korea strategy.<sup>20</sup> Also in 2001, a draft UN convention to limit small arms trafficking was singularly opposed by the Bush administration's insistence on curtailment of the conventions terms. The US was uncompromising on limits to civilian small arms ownership and advocated several other changes that weakened the draft convention.<sup>21</sup>

The US has held many countries to high standards on international issues such as human rights, technology transfers, antiterrorism, and narcotics interdiction, imposing punishment on those that fail to meet US standards.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, the US has frequently been wary of taking on international commitments. For example, the US has declined to ratify the International Criminal Court and the UN conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. While the US was a major contributor to the growth of multilateral free trade initiatives in the 1990s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, it engaged in unilateralism to gain market concessions.<sup>23</sup> The US has also been reluctant to embrace conventions that address world-wide issues such as global warming, evidenced by the Bush administration's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001.

## **A New Foreign Policy Context**

The Cold War presented a clear threat to the US and its allies, and dominated the foreign policy agenda. The US embraced institutions to create a stable international environment that balanced the Soviet security threat. However, the end of the Cold War has permitted a new set of security threats to move to the forefront unsettling the old foreign policy framework. This new set of security threats includes drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, proliferation of WMD, refugee movements, uncontrolled and illegal immigration, environmental risks, and international terrorism.<sup>24</sup> While these problems were pre-existing, they were overshadowed by the Cold War threat. However, the opening of societies, economies, and technologies since the end of the Cold War has increased the extent of the threat “beyond sovereignty and traditional state responses.”<sup>25</sup> Indeed, US post-Cold War foreign policy agenda has become entangled in international problems that ignore borders and hinder unilateral responses. These issues are difficult to address because US policies that support and promote open, democratic societies, are also the policies that facilitate many of the threats. Clearly, the challenges are vast and to appropriately deal with these security threats a degree of international cooperation is necessary.

The end of the Cold War has also led the US to excessive reliance on its military instrument of power spurring anti-American sentiment, upsetting alliances, and prompting balancing behavior by Russia and China.<sup>26</sup> Military preeminence provided America the means to ensure security and establish international stability as a global leader. In this role the military instrument has shifted to include preemptive and preventive measures to counter threats as outlined in the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies.<sup>27</sup> Coupled with an increasing propensity for unilateral engagement, the costs of current US foreign policy strategy outweigh the benefits.

## **Cost/Benefit Breakdown**

Proponents of unilateralism note a number of problems with multilateral cooperation. First, multilateral arrangements limit the power that the US derives from its hegemonic status by restricting the range of options available to act on issues of national interest. The argument follows that a unilateral engagement policy affords the US full sovereignty and the freedom to pursue courses of action devoid of outside interference. Second, multilateral institutions subject the US to “free-riding” and “buck passing.”<sup>28</sup> In the first instance, the US is subject to the costs of participation as an endowed contributor, while free-riding members benefit from the resources supplied by the US, incurring no costs of membership. In the second case, inefficiencies in the institution develop when responsibilities are not clearly delegated. Often a key contributor in multilateral institutions, the US bears the burden of responsibility because lesser members neglect to assume a contributing role. Third, practicing multilateralism usually requires consent of all members when engaging institutional issues. This course of action not only prevents members from acting swiftly, it also results in watered down policy that limits goals and restricts means for implementation. Lastly, opponents of multilateralism suggest that involvement in international institutions weakens US sovereignty by subjugating it to institutional governance.<sup>29</sup> Unilateralists fear this arrangement could mandate US engagement on issues which the US has no interest.

In contrast, proponents of multilateralism contend that unilateral action undermines America’s long-term interests and carries with it a number of negative international consequences. While the US may covet the freedom of action permitted by unilateralism, its limitations must not be ignored. As previously alluded, a unilateral US foreign engagement policy will face difficulty dealing with the array of international problems surfacing in the global

environment. Multilateralism increases the options available to the US for dealing with these global challenges.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, international institutions “can provide mechanisms to consult, resolve differences, solve problems, share burdens and risks, coordinate action, and monitor and enforce commitments.”<sup>31</sup> America could gain from its current hegemonic status by creating and participating in international institutions that benefit both the US and the rest of the world.

According to Joseph Nye, the US benefits from the growth of worldwide networks of interdependence because “globalization takes place in their language.” Embracing worldwide networks and international institutions provides an important source of “soft power” for the US enabling it to set the global political agenda.<sup>32</sup> In the age of globalization and information, hard power instruments such as military dominance is often an inadequate or inefficient means to attain goals. While military power remains important, soft power instruments will continue to wield heavier influence as globalization evolves. Unilateral employment of hard power instruments projects arrogance and a disregard for interests of international actors that weakens America’s soft power.<sup>33</sup> As a result, various countries, including allies, often view US unilateralism with impudence. When the US engages in arrogant unilateralism both state and non-state actors are motivated to take actions that balance American power.<sup>34</sup> Multilateralism eliminates this resistance because acting within the rules and norms of institutions generates international legitimacy. In addition, the legitimacy derived from the institutional framework can benefit the US by compelling international actors to operate within rules and norms that promote US interests.<sup>35</sup>

## **Chapter 3: Methodology**

### **Justification**

The scenario planning methodology allows decision makers to envision a future context in which important actions and decisions take place. It examines factors that impact the environment in which strategic decisions are made and provides a framework that allows decision makers to anticipate the consequences of alternative courses of action. The valuable insights gained from scenario planning provides policymakers the tools needed to make sound decisions in the present context that will yield favorable results regardless of what the future holds.<sup>36</sup> Scenario planning prepares decision makers to act with certainty today, despite the uncertainties of tomorrow.

This research paper will use the scenario-planning process to portray US multilateral engagement solutions across an array of alternative futures to uncover the positive benefits of multilateral engagement in each possible future scenario. Where appropriate, it will also identify possible negative implications of both policy alternatives. The US foreign policy background analysis presented earlier provides a foundation that will guide strategy choices for each scenario. This research examines opportunities and challenges of alternative futures that may confront policymakers in an unpredictable global context to expose possible benefits of a future multilateral foreign policy strategy. The results of this study will help to guide future national security strategy to the best possible course for future foreign policy engagement regardless of changes in the international system. By examining US attitude toward multilateralism, reviewing historic US foreign policy strategy and engagement, and assessing the benefits and costs of unilateral and multilateral policy engagement international, this research will bring to light an important issue with major impact on national security and the status of American

hegemony. The scenario-planning process goes one step farther by building a case for multilateralism in future US foreign policy engagement.

### Scenario Planning Process

Scenario planning has a process that allows policymakers to examine a range of possible futures and prepare a course of action for all possibilities. This process accounts for otherwise unforeseen events, and conveys the effects of policy choices. Simulating policy choices in a range of possible futures allows policymakers to select the particular actions that yield the best outcome.<sup>37</sup> In *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*, Peter Schwartz describes eight steps to developing scenarios which provide the construct for this study (see Table 1.):

**Table 1. Scenario Development Steps**


Step 1	Identify focal issue or decision <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify near-term decision or issue with long-term influence</li> </ul>
Step 2	Key forces in the local environment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List key factors influencing success or failure of the decision</li> </ul>
Step 3	Driving forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List driving forces that influence the key factors</li> </ul>
Step 4	Rank by importance and uncertainty <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rank key factors and driving forces on degree of importance to success of the decision and degree of uncertainty surrounding factors and trends</li> </ul>
Step 5	Selecting scenario logics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Present axes of critical uncertainties in a matrix of significant scenario drivers</li> </ul>
Step 6	Fleshing out the scenarios <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop a narrative using key factors and trends that lead to a plausible future scenario</li> </ul>
Step 7	Implications <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Examine the decision in each scenario to determine vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Determine how strategy can be adapted for success in all scenarios</li> </ul>
Step 8	Selection of leading indicators and signposts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify indicators to monitor how the future is unfolding</li> </ul>

**Source:** Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*. New York, NY: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1991, p. 241-246.



The focal issue identified for this study is future US foreign engagement policy. The key decision is whether to face future security challenges with a unilateral engagement policy or through multilateralism. Key factors influencing the success or failure of this decision include American exceptionalism, the domestic political structure, US hegemony, and a history of unilateralism.<sup>38</sup> The United States' attitude toward foreign policy depends on a vast and increasing list of driving forces that influence these key factors. World stability issues such as global terrorism, WMD, and regional conflicts; globalization opportunities and challenges; public opinion and mobilization; the rise of another great power, world opinion of democracy; and world support for US unilateralism are all driving forces that influence the future of US foreign policy.<sup>39</sup>

After consideration of the importance and uncertainty of the aforementioned key factors and driving forces, predetermined elements that appear certain to play out regardless of which future comes to pass and critical uncertainties that will influence the future in an unpredictable manner are established.<sup>40</sup> Predetermined elements of this analysis include the rise of a multipolar world and continued instability among the world's less developed, non-integrating societies. In constructing future scenarios for this research, critical uncertainties to be examined will include the extent of backlash, such as terrorism, directed at the US from unstable societies and the nature of US relations with rising peer competitors. The critical uncertainties are presented along the axes in the scenario matrix below (see Figure 1). The four future scenarios identified in the matrix are described in narrative in the following chapter. The implications of multilateral engagement are examined for each scenario.



**Figure 1. Scenario Matrix**

## **Chapter 4: Scenario Planning**

### **Scenario 1: Great Power Cooperation**

The first scenario considers a global context in which the US shares warm relations with a peer competitor. This scenario is also characterized by an international environment in which the unstable societies of the world exhibit low backlash to US global power and influence. This plausible future spawns an atmosphere conducive to cooperative international efforts that serves the global common. The narrative that follows demonstrates how US multilateral engagement paves the way for “Great Power Cooperation.”

After two decades of conflict in the Middle East, collective protest pressured the Obama administration to redirect defense expenditures to fuel a US economy firmly entrenched in recession. The President directed a complete withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan by 2013. This troop withdrawal marked the beginning of a decade long contraction in US economic and military power. In stark contrast to the approximate 5.8% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) military spending budget allotted during the ten years prior to 2013, US military expenditures for the next decade would be reduced to a near pre-9/11 budget averaging about 2.8% of GDP.<sup>41</sup> Inefficiencies in both government and private sectors led to high unemployment and low productivity that stalled US economic recovery. After reaching a \$14.3 trillion peak in 2008, US GDP contracted an average of 2% until bottoming out at \$10.5 trillion in 2023.<sup>42</sup> Approximately 75% of the world’s population suffered economic recession in varying degrees between 2013 and 2023. Russia stagnated while fortifying economic bonds that would fuel Europe’s increasing energy dependence, while Indo/Pakistani relations normalized as each nation turned inward to confront internal economic issues.

Unexpectedly, China emerged relatively immune to the global economic depression. While China's growth did slow due to reduced global demand, efficiencies in China's state-owned enterprises permitted swift economic reform. Efficiency of the state, coupled with abundant manpower and innovation, was employed to improve infrastructure and support continued growth momentum. As a result, China's GDP grew at about 5% to \$8.8 trillion, more than doubling throughout the decade long global depression.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, China's grand strategy to engineer its rise to great power status within the constraints of a unipolar international system that the United States dominated was realized after 2013.<sup>44</sup> China succeeded in building its economic and military power without alarming the United States, and in doing so averted any notable US reaction. China also successfully avoided the security dilemma with diplomacy and by acting as a responsible member of the international community. Accordingly, in response to America's contracting military budget, China reduced its own military spending. In 2021, these developments culminated in Taiwan's voluntary assimilation into greater China. Trailing by only \$1.7 trillion in 2023, China was on track to overtake US GDP within three years. The bipolar world reemerged as China ascended to power, a peaceful rival to US hegemony.

Sluggish political and economic reform finally permitted the US economy to awaken in 2024. After a fourteen year hiatus from Western imperial capitalism and a decade of respectful diplomacy, global anti-American Muslim extremism diminished. Confronting an inadequate adversary in the West, Muslim extremist efforts turned inward muting their international voice and reducing the prospects for global terror. Facing its first true peer-competitor in over three decades, America's policymakers reemerged with revolutionary ideas for US diplomatic and information instruments of national power. Cold War legacy politicians had left politics purging archaic neo-realist inclinations. A new generation of policymakers acknowledged the need for

legitimate supranational governance to maintain and protect the global economy, information networks, and international security.

The ten year depression served to deepen global recognition of interdependencies among nations. Armed with an intense understanding of global challenges and of the consequences of neglecting global issues, by 2025 most nations of the world had become fully integrated into regional associations such as the European Union. Recognizing that the US no longer held a monopoly on world power, and that global challenges had brought about popular support for a global government that could prevent international conflicts while confronting global issues, policymakers embraced multilateralism with two initiatives. The first aimed at preserving the peace with China. The second initiative would secure a position of leadership for America in a legitimate supranational government.

The US responded to China's rise to power with two instruments. First, the US built interdependencies with China that generated cooperation encouraging Beijing to maintain the status quo. Second, and most importantly, the US mobilized alliances to counter uncertainties about China's future strategy to dissuade Beijing from posing unacceptable threats to US interests. Certainly, security challenges such as the modernization and growth of China's military raised serious questions when viewed from the Realist perspective. Indeed, the Realist perspective suggests that US policymakers should have pursued self-interests and countered with a national strategy that called for containment through more investment in military efforts in the region.<sup>45</sup> However, China demonstrated efforts to maintain a peaceful environment for growth by maintaining an activist agenda, establishing a reputation as a responsible actor, and acting to reduce anxiety about its rise to power.<sup>46</sup> Utilizing military and economic instruments of power as the realist perspective prescribes would have been counterproductive to US interests. Instead,

multilateralism offered a method to employ instruments of power that would act to contain Chinese aggression should the situation arise, while not causing China to counter US strategy aggressively. Reaffirming alliances in the region with allies such as Japan and Australia demonstrated a multilateral willingness to oppose China should it choose to act out of line.

America's second multilateral initiative was an aggressive campaign to establish a legitimate supranational government. Relaxing a long held preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty, US policymakers recognized that legitimate global governance was the only effective framework for addressing many critical global issues. Noting the insufficient empowerment of the UN, the US aimed to replace it with a new global government that would foster effective international cooperation on global issues. At the center of this mechanism would be a heavily US-backed Global Military Force (GMF) for conducting aggressive international military action, post-conflict stability operations, and peacekeeping. By 2030, the US had reduced its domestic military spending by 25% with another 25% reduction planned by 2035. A corresponding increase in US funding flowed to the GMF. In August of 2033, the US/Russia Nuclear Weapons Transfer Agreement was signed transferring control of half of both nations' nuclear arsenals to the GMF. Under the pressure and scrutiny of the new global government, all of the world's nuclear weapons states had followed suit within two years. By the end of the decade, it was clear that maturation of the GMF virtually dismissed the notion of state-on-state international military aggression. US multilateralism had ushered in the "new world order" that had eluded the nations of the world for generations.

## **Scenario 2: Burdensharing**

The US also maintains cordial peer competitor relations in the second scenario developed for this study. However, in this possible future unstable societies of the world demonstrate

excessive backlash to nations possessing global power and influence. This atmosphere produces an environment that requires formidable stability operations to achieve global security. The narrative that follows demonstrates how US multilateral engagement could result in international “Burden-sharing.”

Faced with the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the first Obama administration was forced to reassess US spending priorities. Defense spending, specifically homeland defense and the war on terror, was a major casualty of US budget reform. Consequently, US troops were withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan prior to securing an enduring stability in the two nations. The premature Middle East withdrawal would lead to further instability in the region feeding Muslim extremism and anti-Americanism. However, the policies enacted by President Obama ultimately restored US economic stability by 2012, locking in a second term for the celebrated president. With the US economy back on track, the second Obama administration redirected its efforts toward international relations. Obama’s “Extended Hand” diplomacy led to more normalized relations with both Iran and North Korea. Consequently, by 2015, a combination of US led economic and diplomatic incentives motivated both nations to abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions.

Sino-American relations also improved during this period. Recognizing the need for a global solution to prevent another worldwide financial crisis, the US and China partnered to reform international economic institutions. Working through the UN, the US and China led a series of reforms in the international financial system that culminated in July 2014 at the UN Conference on Monetary and Financial Stability in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Dubbed the Bretton Woods II Agreements, the international community established a stable system of global economic governance. While the arrangements reached at Bretton Woods II strengthened

the bonds of the worlds developed countries, they largely ignored broader social and economic issues of emerging markets and less developed countries. An oversight that would fuel backlash directed at many of the world's largest economies, namely the US and China.<sup>47</sup>

China experienced unprecedented economic growth during the five years following Bretton Woods II. The result was a steady increase in GDP and erosion of Beijing's traditional control over the lives of the Chinese population, as rapid economic growth triggered greater labor mobility and heightened expectations of greater financial opportunities.<sup>48</sup> However, one unfortunate byproduct of the opening of Chinese society was the emboldening of Muslim separatists in the western Xinjiang province. Anti-Chinese unrest resulting from seventy years of cultural and religious repression paved the way for organized Islamic fundamentalism in newly liberalized China, and the failures of both Soviet and US occupations in Afghanistan demonstrated that even the most powerful opponent was susceptible to terrorist extremism.<sup>49</sup> By 2020, China had a full scale Islamic fundamentalist insurgency underway in Xinjiang.

Unfortunately, US economic and diplomatic successes of the previous decade were derailed in 2021 when a single-engine Cessna 182 aircraft loaded with high explosives was crashed into a mass of spectators gathered at the National Mall to observe the presidential inauguration. The tragedy was replicated in New Orleans only two weeks later when another Cessna packed with the same explosive payload plowed into a football stadium hosting the Super Bowl. The two attacks took the lives of nearly 600 Americans. Staggering, America once again found its domestic financial markets teetering on the brink of collapse with a diminished capability for a sustained military response to a serious anti-American terror campaign. America's experience with the war on terror during the first decade of the twenty-first century had bred skepticism about a military response to the extremist attacks, and about the efficacy of



American interventions abroad. America was not willing to endure another Iraq/Afghanistan type conflict.

Both China and the West appeared to be in a no-win situation with Muslim extremism. If the economic giants chose to pursue a pacifist agenda they risked exposure to further fundamentalist backlash—an unacceptable option. If they chose to pursue a military response, it would further fuel instability and once again alienate many Islamic states that were central to economic and energy security priorities. Faced with this challenge, US policymakers developed a carefully measured strategy to address the roots of global instability and negate the influence of Islamic fundamentalist movements. In March 2021, addressing the UN Security Council the US President outlined a global strategy that called for the establishment of a UN Stability Operations Force. Part of the address follows:

We must not return to the failed policies of yesterday. We must not concern ourselves with the question of who perpetrated these monstrous attacks. Nor should we be concerned with where best to exact revenge. If nothing else, history has taught us that the only correct questions to ask are why—why any faction would be driven to perpetrate such crimes against humanity? And how—how have we arrived at this precarious state? And what—what can we do now as a world community to improve global stability and eradicate such horrific motives from this Earth? Armed with these questions, the UN must deploy an international envoy of aggressive diplomacy. This envoy must issue mandates to negotiate regional stability in Central Asia and wherever extremist motives threaten peace and humanity. They will establish a just peace that promotes self-sustaining progress. The goal is not to repress Islamic culture or any underlying movements for independence, but rather to find ways to negate extremist influence and to help build tolerant and hopeful societies that honor humanity and promote peace.<sup>50</sup> To this end, support from all nations of the world will back legitimate UN mandates. Sharing the burden, powerful nations endowed with a depth of resources and capabilities will sustain stability operations that will build, rather than destroy, societies and cultures. This long-term endeavor will undoubtedly encounter resistance. However, we can be certain that the cooperative spirit of global community and a powerful strategy for stability and just peace will prevail. This institution was founded to fulfill the promises of this voyage. Together, we must develop a sustainable future by transforming the unstable regions of the world. In doing so, we will advance the ideals on which the United Nations was created.<sup>51</sup>

Shortly after the President's address, the UN passed a resolution authorizing the UN International Stability Operations Force (UN-ISOF). Major contributions from the US and China, armed the UN-ISOF with the resources necessary to provide effective security, governance, and economic development to key areas of instability across the globe. With the US and China in leadership roles the UN-ISOF marshaled a coordinated international effort that identified global interests region by region. The force determined regional strategies based on those interests, and then adopted developmental approaches that would effectively influence the behavior of target populations.<sup>52</sup> Abundant resources, contributed in large part by the US and China, were then committed to support each regional approach.

By 2025, global stability operations were well underway with a number of noteworthy successes. Among the broader victories arising from UN-ISOF efforts was an addendum to the Bretton Woods II agreement that spoke to social and economic issues of emerging markets and less developed countries ensuring equitable availability of resources and opportunity for sustainable development. A less obvious success story was the opportunity for China to work in partnership with America. The information sharing and strategic innovations that evolved from UN-ISOF coordination led the Chinese government to develop a stability strategy for the Xinjiang province that permitted the nation to leapfrog years of counter-insurgency efforts. By 2030, an estimated 40 million Muslim separatists and fundamentalists in China, Central Asia, and beyond had peacefully assimilated as productive members of the global community.

### **Scenario 3: Cold War II**

The third scenario returns to a global context that is characterized by an international environment in which the unstable societies of the world exhibit low backlash to US global power and influence. But in contrast to the previous scenarios a confrontational environment

emerges where the US maintains cold relations with a peer competitor. This future context produces an atmosphere unfavorable for cooperative global efforts to improve international welfare. The narrative that follows illustrates the benefits of US multilateral engagement efforts to contain and reverse the negative impacts of “Cold War II.”

Contrary to the previous ten years, the decade following 2010 was characterized by significant progress toward peace and stability in the Middle East and Central Asia. Concerted US diplomatic efforts yielded unprecedented success with Iran. Warned of an imminent Israeli military campaign and enticed by economic incentives, Tehran’s regional policy arrived at an unexpected turning point in talks with US officials in 2012. Following intense negotiations, Iran agreed to freeze uranium enrichment activities and abandon its nuclear program. Iranian concessions were contingent upon an immediate Israeli military stand-down and the easing of severe UN economic sanctions imposed in 2010 that froze Iranian assets and imposed strict trade bans. As a follow-up to this diplomatic breakthrough the US offered further economic incentives aimed at improving Iran’s energy infrastructure. In return Iran’s Supreme Leader denounced all acts of fundamentalism that invoked terror attacks in the name of Islam, and called on the Muslim brotherhood to contain Islamic extremism worldwide. These events set the stage for a decade of successful stability operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories. By 2020, all governments in the Middle East and Central Asia were self-sustaining and faced no imminent regional security threats.

In contrast, Sino-American relations reached a breaking point by 2020. China’s quick rebound from the global recession that ended in 2010 led to an unprecedented hunger for natural resources. Faced with near complete depletion of its domestic resource base, Beijing embarked on an aggressive global quest for resources. As China’s reach spread to include significant

quarters of Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and Indonesia, intense Sino-American resource competition began to drive both nations' strategic policies. Beijing's insistence on protection of its territorial resources and exclusive economic zone led to numerous maritime confrontations. In 2018, these confrontations reached a pinnacle when Beijing substantiated a decade of rhetoric and military posturing by staging a surprise assault to force Taiwan's reunification. The invasion was met with little resistance in Taiwan, and resulted in only a small number of casualties. The US did not exercise a military response to the Taiwan invasion. US policymakers recognized that Beijing's tactics signified a fundamental change in China's strategic policy, and estimated that total war would be the price for interference. Instead, America's primary responses to China's aggression included intensified rhetoric, a military buildup in the Pacific, and suspension of debt repayment.

To counter the perceived US threat, China intensified its space program under the pretext of territorial defense. In April 2020, Beijing announced that it possessed the capability to destroy the US military satellite infrastructure and attack the US from space.<sup>53</sup> Within one month, US intelligence sources confirmed that China had indeed weaponized space and had fielded anti-satellite systems. China had closed the space capability gap leading the US to develop a parallel deterrent capability. Space had been transformed into a geopolitical frontier that would host advanced technology warfare.<sup>54</sup> For the next decade, Sino-American relations would be centered on a strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) of advanced technology assets (ATA). Similar to the Soviet-American Cold War MAD strategy, MAD of ATA led to relatively stable, though strained, Sino-American relations.

During this period, the US adopted a number of strategies to secure the moral high ground and foster cooperation with China. First, beginning in 2030, the US took a lead role

working with the UN Environmental Organization (UNEO) focusing efforts on environmental policy implementation, regional cooperation, and environmental law and conventions.<sup>55</sup> Under US leadership, the UNEO pressed and eventually garnered Beijing's compliance with legal, environmental, and labor standards that largely reduced the corruption, pollution, and exploitation that historically accompanied the pursuit of natural resources.<sup>56</sup> The US also strongly supported the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs in multiple efforts. Most notably, the US backed the 2030 Convention on International Space Standards supporting the safe, secure, and sustainable development of outer space.<sup>57</sup> Later, in 2033, the US led four party talks with China, Russia, and India that culminated in the Space Weapons Reduction Treaty; a milestone that would lead to the eventual disarmament of space. The Space Weapons Reduction Treaty also led to opportunities for effective Sino-American cooperation. The US promoted opportunities to cooperate with China on the space disarmament program fostering goodwill and the sharing of technology. Remarkably, the space disarmament program also supported a new international space station that promised all participants an equal voice.<sup>58</sup>

Concurrent with Sino-American cooperation initiatives, US policymakers recognized that the international public sector had suffered as a result of second Cold War policies. To remedy the situation, the US instituted a global strategy aimed at mobilizing international support for cooperative engagement on global issues. Rather than assume the role of global policeman, US leadership in international affairs focused on bolstering multilateral institutions capable of reforming global governance and managing key international public sector issues.<sup>59</sup> By the mid-2030's, vigorous US multilateral engagement had not only normalized relations with China bringing an end to Cold War II, it also reaffirmed America as a benevolent global leader.

#### **Scenario 4: Complex Hostility**

The fourth scenario once again considers a global context in which a confrontational environment emerges where the US maintains cold relations with a peer competitor. However, in contrast to the preceding scenario, unstable societies of the world demonstrate intense backlash to nations possessing global power and influence. This future context complicates strategic efforts of powerful states and creates ominous conditions for global cooperative efforts to improve international stability. The narrative that follows illustrates the benefits of US multilateral engagement efforts in a world characterized by “Complex Hostility.”

The deep recession of the late 2000s caused US policymakers to divert attention from the Long War and America’s struggle against extremism. Overstating initial observations of Iraqi stability and self-sustainment, the Obama administration used the opportunity to justify US troop withdrawal, and in 2011, officially ended Operation Iraqi Freedom claiming success. Unfortunately, insurgent activities in Iraq increased rapidly after the US departure shattering its fragile government. Despite outcries for support from senior Iraqi government officials, US policymakers capriciously declared the insurgency an internal problem.

Meanwhile, the troop buildup in Afghanistan expected as a follow-up to the US withdrawal from Iraq never materialized. Pressured to focus resources on domestic economic recovery, in 2010, US officials took advantage of the customary wintertime Taliban operational pause to tout progress in defeating Taliban and al Qaeda efforts in Afghanistan. The State Department also over-publicized Pakistani military operations against Taliban strongholds along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to cultivate a perception of progress. US policymakers leveraged this fabricated progress to incrementally drawdown US presence in Afghanistan over a five year period. By 2015, statements by US Central Command officials

indicated that less than one thousand American troops remained deployed in Afghanistan. Accordingly, Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terror networks in Afghanistan grew nearly sevenfold over the corresponding period. Overwhelmed by Taliban and al Qaeda attacks in outlying areas, the 5,000 UN troops that remained in Afghanistan for peacekeeping operations after the US drawdown were unable to extend policing efforts beyond Afghanistan's central region. As result, large areas of Afghanistan reverted to Taliban control permitting a resurgence of global terrorism supported by the Afghan drug trade and rogue state sponsorship.<sup>60</sup>

US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan during the Obama administration marked a clearly inward shift in America's Long War strategy. Rather than take the war to the enemy, the administration brought resources home to strengthen infrastructure, bolster domestic emergency response capabilities, and harden territorial defenses. This new policy directly benefited America's economy, and coupled with a number of other domestic stimulus efforts, US economic recovery was well underway by 2015. However, abandoning Iraq and Afghanistan would prove costly for the US. First, US withdrawal from Iraq, failure of the Iraqi government, and subsequent denial of support led to wholesale condemnation of US policy, further degrading America's international legitimacy. Second, withdrawal from Afghanistan further destabilized the region, significantly increased the frequency and intensity of terror attacks directed at Western interests, and underpinned international distrust of US intentions.

Perceiving an opportunity to strengthen its international standing and further strategic objectives, China offered diplomatic and economic support to the resurgent Ba'ath party in Iraq. Between 2013 and 2016, China covertly supplied arms to Sunni insurgents sympathetic to the Ba'ath party through Iran. By 2017, the Ba'ath party had reconstituted a frail government and, in 2018, signed an energy cooperation agreement with China.

Securing access to oil in Iraq was not nearly enough to fulfill China's massive appetite for energy resources. Following the economic recession in the late 2000s, China's economy resumed unprecedented growth. By 2017, China's rise to power was only limited by its access to resources. For that reason, after 2017, China's national strategy was driven almost entirely by the need to secure its energy requirements. Consequently, precarious Sino-American relations became even more strained over issues of energy competition. During this period, China reaffirmed its alliance with Russia strengthening the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to counter the perceived US threat. Together, China and Russia developed an imperialistic plan to secure a position of global power for themselves while decreasing that of the West. To begin, Russia remained a relatively silent member of the SCO, allowing China to take the lead. This tactic permitted Russia to nurture its energy trade arrangements with the EU keeping all of Europe dependent on Russian energy imports. Next, China endeavored to increase the SCO's regional power and influence. In 2018, the SCO established a military arm, extended membership to Iran and North Korea, and forced membership on Mongolia. By 2020, the necessary groundwork had been laid to begin the third phase of the Sino-Russian strategy. In March 2020, Beijing held secret talks with Iran's Supreme Leader initiating covert support for an Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia to secure energy resources. Beijing pledged to rapidly facilitate Iran's nuclear weapons program in return for access to acquired Saudi oil. The two parties agreed on terms and planning for the invasion of the Arabian Peninsula commenced in April 2020.

Meanwhile, Riyadh received unambiguous intelligence indications that Iran was planning the invasion, and US imagery intelligence confirmed a military buildup along Iran's gulf coast. US analysts estimated that required preparation time would allow for an invasion no earlier than



April 2021. The US Defense Department immediately began contingency planning and intensified intelligence gathering efforts in the region. Within one month, the Central Intelligence Agency had uncovered smoking gun evidence that proved China's involvement in engineering the invasion plan. While no direct evidence pointed to Russian involvement, SCO activity over the preceding five years erased any suggestion of Russian virtue. Nevertheless, Russia found itself immune to retribution. The EU's dependence on Russian energy provided more than enough motivation for the West to maintain the status quo with Russia. Consequently, traditional European allies would sit on the sidelines throughout this crisis.

Incidentally, traditional Indo-Russian cooperation had stagnated after the fall of the Soviet Union and remained limited through 2021.<sup>61</sup> This factor, coupled with intense Indo-Sino competition for Saudi Arabian energy resources conveniently led India to ally with the US to protect its democratic values and secure energy needs. Washington officials, in coordination with New Delhi, quickly devised a multilateral strategy of containment that would obstruct the SCO's regional and global influence by marshalling UN censure of SCO actions, and developed a US-led military bloc in Asia to deter SCO aggression and redirect Chinese global ambitions.

In June 2021, led by US diplomats, a three-party US-India-Saudi Arabia envoy presented a strong case for SCO censure to the UN general assembly. The address accused China and its allies of starting a new era of imperialism in the Persian Gulf.<sup>62</sup> Two weeks later, the UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution condemning China's support of the Saudi invasion plan and requiring an Iranian military pull back. The US made a concerted effort to play a guiding role in UN negotiations to maximize its diplomatic and propaganda maneuverability, and lay the ground work for a US-led military bloc in Asia.<sup>63</sup> With UN support, the US and India launched massive military exercises in the Indian Ocean and began

naval deployments to the Persian Gulf. Throughout the crisis, US officials pressed Riyadh to continue oil exports to China to prevent any hasty reaction from Beijing.

Later in 2021, the United Arab Emirates hosted talks that led to the Dubai Treaty. The treaty established the Asian-America Alliance (A3). A military alliance intended to defend against the threat of SCO aggression, the A3 included the US, India, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and six other member states. Initial UN pressures temporarily blocked China's designs for the Iranian invasion into Saudi Arabia, but a robust deterrent force would be needed to ensure long-term regional security. So, over the next five years, the US surrounded China and Iran with American and A3 ground and naval forces, as well as incomparable air power and WMD.<sup>64</sup>

Russia retracted its support for China's imperial designs following UN condemnation, but to relieve Europe of future SCO influence, the US developed a multilateral plan to reshape global energy trade relations. Working in coordination with the UN and the International Energy Agency the US ushered a new international energy security pact that restructured the Asian-European energy trade framework. The pact redirected China's Saudi oil imports to Europe, and sent European Energy imports from Russia to China. The new energy trade framework not only freed Europe from SCO control, it also significantly reduced China's imperialistic motivations by providing convenient access to Russian energy resources. Unchained from the necessity to secure access to energy resources and under heavy UN pressure, in 2023, China withdrew from its contract to facilitate Iran's nuclear weapons program.

By 2025, US foreign policy efforts to contain China and deter SCO aggression had significantly reshaped the world's geo-political landscape. A multi-polar world emerged during this period with stabilized NATO-A3-SCO relations. Indeed, America's multilateral engagement policies earned the US a leadership role in two of the world's most powerful mutual security

organizations. In addition, most international terrorism stemming from the Middle East and Central Asia was also eliminated by 2025 because traditional SCO state sponsors of terrorism wished to avoid any future NATO or A3 confrontation. This emergent global stability allowed the US to divert appropriate resources away from deterrence and homeland defense to support UN peacekeeping and development efforts aimed at many of the world's failed states.

## **Chapter 6: Conclusion**

### **Scenarios Assessment**

This research was conducted to help guide future national security strategy to the best possible course for future foreign policy engagement regardless of changes in the international system. The benefit of the scenario-planning research method in the realm of foreign policy studies is its ability to depict alternative futures within which future leaders will attempt to make sound policy choices. The future scenarios presented in this study raised important issues that may confront tomorrow's policymakers. Each scenario reveals positive benefits of multilateral engagement for America's international status and long-term interests.

Assessment of the Scenario 1 suggests that multilateral engagement would be an effective strategy to preserve the peace with an emergent peer competitor. Building interdependencies could promote cooperation with a rising peer, while mobilizing international alliances to counter uncertainties about future competition could dissuade unacceptable threats to US interests. The scenario also suggests that embracing multilateralism to empower a legitimate supranational government could usher in a "new world order" that would virtually dismiss the notion of international military aggression.

Scenario 2 suggests that multilateral engagement could provide a global solution to mitigate another worldwide financial crisis by mobilizing the international community to establish a stable system of global economic governance. The scenario also suggests that US policymakers could develop a multilateral strategy to address the roots of global instability and negate the influence of extremist movements. Arming a potent international stability force with the resources necessary to provide effective security, governance, and economic development to key areas of instability across the globe would ensure equitable availability of resources and

opportunity for sustainable development. These partnerships could provide the opportunity for information sharing and strategic innovations that would allow many nations to leapfrog years of development, struggle, and/or conflict.

Assessment of Scenario 3 indicates that embracing multilateral policy could produce stabilized relations with an adversarial peer competitor and reaffirm America's status as a benevolent global leader. By adopting strategies that secure the moral high ground and foster cooperation the US could mobilize international initiatives that focus on environmental policy implementation, regional cooperation, and environmental law and conventions.<sup>65</sup> With US backing, such undertakings could support safe, secure, and sustainable development of the global commons.<sup>66</sup> In addition, promoting such opportunities to cooperate with peer competitors would foster goodwill and the sharing of technologies. Instituting a multilateral strategy aimed at mobilizing international support for cooperative engagement on global issues would empower the institutions that could reform global governance and manage key international public sector issues.<sup>67</sup>

Scenario 4 indicates that a multilateral strategy of containment could obstruct an imperialistic challenger's regional and global influence by marshalling international censure, and by establishing a multinational military bloc to deter aggression and suppress global ambitions. Playing a guiding role in such efforts could maximize US diplomatic maneuverability.<sup>68</sup> Multilateralism could also be employed to reshape global energy trade relations that would free the US and its allies from reliance on hostile energy producers. Such efforts could also significantly reduce imperialistic motivations by providing energy hungry challengers convenient access to energy resources. As a result, a significantly reshaped the geo-political landscape could emerge with stabilized relations among peer competitors. This emergent global

stability would eventually allow resources to be redirected from deterrence to support international peacekeeping and development efforts.

## **Summary**

America's trend toward unilateral action during the last two decades has weakened its international status and undermined its long-term interests.<sup>69</sup> The strategy has evoked hostility toward the US and eroded its international legitimacy.<sup>70</sup> The time is right to reexamine America's foreign policy strategy to chart a course of action that will best assure the future interests of the US and its allies.

Assessment of the scenarios considered for this study suggests that a multilateral engagement foreign policy would ensure national security is protected and America's global leadership maintained regardless of future changes in the international system. Employing the scenario-planning approach to identify potential US multilateral engagement solutions across an array of alternative futures uncovered the possible benefits of multilateral engagement. Analysis of alternative futures by means of the scenario-planning process has plainly demonstrated that multilateral engagement provides an attractive course for securing national security and maintaining America's global leadership.

Despite the positive benefits of multilateralism exposed in this study, critics may still contend that the anarchic international environment calls for America to act alone to provide its own security and ensure its own interests no matter what future should emerge. Since the scope of this study limited scenario assessment to multilateral engagement strategies, additional scenario-planning research centered on unilateral engagement strategies is needed to further inform policymakers in formulating America's future foreign policy. Evaluating both

multilateral and unilateral engagement options will more clearly delineate costs and benefits of each foreign policy option.

## Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

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<sup>1</sup> Malone, *Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Kennedy, *America Back on Track*, 46-47.

<sup>3</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project. "Global Public Opinion."

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy*, xiv.

<sup>6</sup> Hathaway, "America, Defender," 121-133.

<sup>7</sup> MacDougal, *Promised Land*, 36, 71-71.

<sup>8</sup> Carter, *Contemporary Cases*, xx.

<sup>9</sup> Zoelliick, Congress and the Making, 23.

<sup>10</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 8.

<sup>11</sup> Caporaso, "International Relations Theory," 53-54.

<sup>12</sup> Weller, "The US, Iraq, and the Use of Force," 81, 94.

<sup>13</sup> Luck, "Bush, Iraq, and the UN," 151.

<sup>14</sup> Kellner, "Preemptive Strikes and the War on Iraq" 170-171.

<sup>15</sup> Blechman, "Emerging from the Intervention Dilemma," 287.

<sup>16</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Cerniello, "Senate Rejects," 26.

<sup>18</sup> White House, Announcement of Withdrawal.

<sup>19</sup> Littlewood, *The Biological Weapons Convention*, 212-15.

<sup>20</sup> Schneider, *Dozens of Nations*.

<sup>21</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 4.

<sup>22</sup> Mathews, "Self-Appointed Global Hall Monitor."

<sup>23</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 5.

<sup>24</sup> Bourantonis, *Multilateralism and Security*, 1; Cusimano, "Beyond sovereignty," 4.

<sup>25</sup> Cusimano, "Beyond sovereignty," 4.

<sup>26</sup> Conetta, *Forceful Engagement*, 3.

<sup>27</sup> Office of the President, *National Security Strategy*, 2002, 6; Office of the President, *National Security Strategy*, 2006, 23.

<sup>28</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 10.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Luck, *Mixed Messages*, 67.

<sup>31</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 10.

<sup>32</sup> Nye, *Paradox*, 78.

<sup>33</sup> Nye, *Paradox*, 11.

<sup>34</sup> Caraley, *American Hegemony*, 119

<sup>35</sup> Martin, "The Rational State," 111-13.

<sup>36</sup> Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View*, p. xiii-xiv.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 29-30.

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- <sup>38</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 7.
- <sup>39</sup> Brzezinski, *The Choice*, 25; Nye, *Paradox*, 77-85; Nye, "Limits of American Power," 108, 119.
- <sup>40</sup> Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View*, xiv, 110; Van der Heijden, *Scenarios*, 87.
- <sup>41</sup> Sharp, "US Defense Spending."
- <sup>42</sup> CIA, "CIA - CIA - The World Factbook – United States."
- <sup>43</sup> CIA, "CIA - The World Factbook – China."
- <sup>44</sup> Goldstein, *Rising Challenge*, 12.
- <sup>45</sup> Forsyth, "Realist Thought," 22.
- <sup>46</sup> NS, ACSC, AY09.
- <sup>47</sup> Stiglitz, "Towards a New Global Economic Compact."
- <sup>48</sup> George, "Commentary No. 73."
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>51</sup> Bush (speech, UN).
- <sup>52</sup> Dale, *War in Afghanistan*.
- <sup>53</sup> Dellios, "China's Space Program," 5.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> United Nations, "UNEP Divisions."
- <sup>56</sup> "Ravenous Dragon." *The Economist*, 4.
- <sup>57</sup> International Civil Aviation Organization. "Strategic Objectives."
- <sup>58</sup> Dellios, "China's Space Program," 6.
- <sup>59</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 437.
- <sup>60</sup> Giraldi, "Twilight in Afghanistan."
- <sup>61</sup> Banerjee, "Prospects for India-Russia Security Relations."
- <sup>62</sup> Lewis, "Confrontation in the Gulf."
- <sup>63</sup> CIA released document, "Soviet Return to the UN."
- <sup>64</sup> Chomsky, "Cold War II."
- <sup>65</sup> United Nations, "UNEP Divisions."
- <sup>66</sup> International Civil Aviation Organization. "Strategic Objectives."
- <sup>67</sup> Patrick, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 437.
- <sup>68</sup> CIA released document, "Soviet Return to the UN."
- <sup>69</sup> Malone, *Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, 4.
- <sup>70</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Global Public Opinion."



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